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Abstract
We consider a pure exchange overlapping generations economy with a
varying number of commodities and consumers per period having possi-
bly non-complete non transitive preferences. We provide a geometric and
direct proof of the Balasko-Shell characterization of Pareto optimal alloca-
tion. As a by-product, we compute an explicit Pareto improving transfer
when the criterion is not satisfied, which is minimal for some suitable
distance.
JEL classification: C62, D50, D62.
Keywords: Overlapping generations model, non complete non transitive
preferences, normal cone, equilibrium, Pareto optimality.
1 Introduction
As already well known, OLG equilibrium allocations may lack in being Pareto
optimal. This market failure was established by Samuelson [23], who attributes
this phenomenon as a lack of double coincidence of wants, and suggests to solve
this by using the role of money. Geanakoplos [16] clarifies this phenomenon
as a result of two facts: generations overlap and infinite horizon. He points
some links between the Samuelson model and the Arrow-Debreu model, and
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established how a durable good such as money, or an infinitely lived asset like
a land, could restore the market failure.
Balasko and Shell [3] provide a criterion based on the asymptotic behavior
of the norm of the prices to characterize Pareto optimal allocation without
durable good or infinitely lived asset. They assume that the preferences are
represented by utility functions so are transitive and complete. Burke [10]
revisits this criterion by focusing in particular on the right definition of the
Gaussian curvature of the indifference surface. Actually, these authors provide
a proof with a first step considering the special case of a single commodity per
period. Then, the generalization to several commodities is only sketched.
Our purpose in this paper is to consider a varying number of commodi-
ties per period, several consumers for each generation and non-complete, non-
transitive preferences, taking advantages of a simpler direct and more geometric
proof of the Balasko- Shell Criterion. Furthermore, as a by-product of the proof,
we compute explicitly a Pareto improving transfer when the allocation does not
satisfy the Balasko-Shell Criterion. Nevertheless, note that the structure of the
proof is strongly based on Balasko-Shell’s one.
Allowing for preferences to be non-complete and non-transitive is interest-
ing since it is less demanding with respect to the rationality axiom. Indeed,
many examples have been given showing that transitivity or completeness of
preferences may not hold. In our case where agents are facing multi attribute
comparisons for multiple goods, their preferences may contain cycles, thus lack
in being transitive, and they may not be able to compare bundles between them,
since an agent may strictly prefer bundles with more of all goods but may not
be able to rank bundles where there is a trade off between these goods.
More precisely, non-complete preferences have been considered in the con-
text of choice under uncertainty. Indeed, an agent may not be able to have a
precise guess about the state of the world, leading her to be unable to compare
two objects. The incompleteness is then related to “indecisiveness in beliefs” ,
which is what Bewley [4] tried to capture in his model of uncertainty. Another
type of non-complete preference, called “indecisiveness in tastes” is described
by Aumann [1], in which case it is due to an inability to compare some certain
outcomes. More recently, Mandler [17, 18] pointed out the need to distinguish
types of preferences for a better understanding of why preferences are non-
complete. Indeed, if the preference of an agent is based on her choice, that is
x is preferred to y if x is chosen over y then it is necessarily complete, but if
it is based on her knowledge, meaning that x is known to be better than y,
then the preference needs not be complete since the agent may not have such a
knowledge. Examples of applications of non-complete preferences can be seen
in many works of Bewley, for instance, they can be applied to dynamic choices
[5], to econometric inference [6] and to innovation and entrepreneurship [7].
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Whenever the axioms of transitivity or completeness are removed, the utility
function does not exist, so that the demand cannot be characterized as the
solution of an optimization problem. It is now a maximal element of a set-valued
mapping and a fixed-point like theorem is required to prove its non-emptiness.
Andreu Mas-Colell (1974) is one of the pioneers who tried to get rid of these
two axioms for the existence of competitive equilibrium. To do so, with David
Gale (see [14]), they have to use a maximal element theorem for lower semi-
continuous set-valued mappings instead of the the standard Kakutani’s fixed
point theorem.
To study optimality conditions, the absence of transitivity and complete-
ness is less problematic since we are working with a reference allocation and
so, given preferred sets. We do not have to deal with the behavior of the de-
mand with respect to price change. Nevertheless, the lack of representation by
a utility function prevent us to use the standard differentiability assumption
and the link between the curvature of the indifference surfaces and the second
derivative of utility function. So we adopt a geometric approach to state the
assumptions directly on the preferred sets. The smoothness assumption is ob-
tained by assuming that the normal cone is an half line. For the upper bound
of the curvature, we use the notion of prox-regularity of the complementary of
the preferred set, introduced in variational analysis by Rockafellar and Poliquin
in [20], which is extensively studied by Thibault and Colombo in [11]. For the
lower bound, which is related to the strict convexity of the preferred sets, we
assume that the truncated preferred sets are included in a suitable ball with a
large enough radius.
Note that an approach based on preferred sets has already been provided
by Borglin and Keiding [9] and by Borglin [8]. Indeed, even if initially they
present the model with utility functions, they introduce the notion of “reduced
models”, that actually consist of the “no-worse-than sets”. They consider char-
acterizations based on parameters that describe the economy such as curvatures
measures, and the efficiency of the reduced models are simplified by considering
an inner and outer approximation of the no-worse-than sets. In the case where
the approximation consists of hyperbolas, they obtain parametric efficiency cri-
teria, that is, based on the parameters of the reduced models. So, this work
can be easily extended to non complete non transitive preferences.
Our main contribution is the simplification of the original proof of Balasko
and Shell and the fact that we directly tackle the multi-commodity case. It
allows us to consider a varying number of commodities at each period. Actually
we show that the parameter αt used by Balasko and Shell to describe the Pareto
improving transfer has a nice geometric interpretation in terms of a radius of
a sphere tangent to the boundary of the preferred set at the allocation. This
remark leads us to use this radius as a particular distance function and to
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compute explicitly the minimal Pareto improving transfer when the criterion is
not satisfied.
Details about the model and assumptions are described in Section 2. Some
preliminary results are provided in Section 3. In particular, we characterize the
weak Pareto optimal allocation in term of the existence of a supporting price
using the normal cone to the preferred sets. The end of this Section explains
how the multi-consumer case can be simplified by considering aggregate feasible
Pareto improving transfers. In Section 4, we provide the proof and we show
which assumptions are used for the if part and for the only if part of the
criterion. We also provide two examples showing that the result is no more
true if one of the conditions on the curvature does not hold true.
We consider this contribution as a first step to be able in future works to
tackle the question in presence of durable commodities and with heterogeneous
longevities of the agents.
2 The model
The following notations are used throughout the paper. We consider several
finite dimensional Euclidean space RL. In each of them, RL+ is the standard
positive cone and RL++ its interior. x ≤ y means that y − x ∈ RL+, x · y denotes
the standard inner product of the vectors x and y, ‖x‖ = √x · x denotes the
standard Euclidean norm. If P is a subset of RL, P¯ denotes its closure and
intP , its interior. B(x, r) (resp. B¯(x, r)) denotes the open (resp. closed) ball
of center x and radius r.
We consider an OLG economy E with infinitely many dates t = 1, 2 . . .
At each date there is a finite set of commodities Lt, and we denote by Lt its
cardinal.
At each date t ∈ N, a nonempty finite set of individuals It is born, living
for two periods, young at date t and old at date t + 1. We start with the first
generation 0 who lives for only one period and consists of the old agents at date
1. I = ∪∞t=0It denotes the set of all individuals and I−0 = ∪∞t=1It.
At each date t ≥ 1, we denote by xi = (xit, xit+1) the consumption by an
individual i in It, which is an element of the consumption set Xi = RLt+ ×RLt+1+ .
The consumption set of consumers of generation 0 is Xi = RL1+ .
Consumers preferences are represented by a (strict) preference relation P i :
Xi → Xi. For all i ∈ I:
ξi ∈ P i(xi) means that ξi is strictly preferred to xi.
ξi ∈ P¯ i(xi), the closure of P i(xi), means that ξi is preferred or indifferent
to xi.
For all i ∈ I, we denote by NP¯ i(xi)(xi) the normal cone of P¯ i(xi) at xi, that
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is,
NP¯ i(xi)(x
i) = {q ∈ RLt × RLt+1 | q · (z − xi) ≤ 0,∀z ∈ P¯ i(xi)}
We now posit the main assumption, which is maintained throughout the
paper.
Assumption A.
a) For all individual i in I, P i(xi) is open in Xi, convex, xi ∈ P¯ i(xi) \ P i(xi)
and P i(xi) +Xi ⊂ P i(xi).
b) Each consumer i has some endowments ei of the goods during his lifetime
which belongs to her consumption set Xi. For each period t ≥ 1, et
denotes the total endowments at this date, that is, et =
∑
i∈It−1∪It e
i
t.
c) For all i ∈ I, for all xi in the interior of Xi, −NP¯ i(xi)(xi) is a half line
{tγi(xi) | t ≥ 0}, defined by γi(xi) which is a continuous mapping on the
interior of Xi satisfying ‖γi(xi)‖ = 1. For all xi in the interior of Xi, for
all i ∈ I−0, , γi(xi) ∈ RLt++ × RLt+1++ and for all i ∈ I0, γi(xi) ∈ RL1++.
Assumption A is a classical assumption in a standard finite economy. If the
preferences are represented by a utility function, it means that it is continuous,
quasi-concave, strictly increasing and smooth on the interior of Xi.
At each date t, there is a spot market for the Lt commodities. The spot
price vector p is an element of
∏∞
t=1R
Lt
++ and pt` is the spot price of commodity
` at date t. We consider the set of normalized prices ∆ := {p ∈ ∏∞t=1RLt++ |
‖p1‖ = 1}. We denote by Πt = (pt, pt+1), for t ≥ 1, and Π0 = p1.
Budget Constraints
The budget constraint at a given price p, for each agent i ∈ I−0 is given by:
Πt · xi = pt · xit + pt+1 · xit+1 ≤ Πt · ei = pt · eit + pt+1 · eit+1,
and for each agent i ∈ I0,
Π0 · xi = p1 · xi1 ≤ Π0 · ei = p1 · ei1.
3 Preliminary results
Let us recall some basic definitions of equilibrium and optimal allocations in a
standard pure exchange OLG economy with multiple commodities. An alloca-
tion (xi) ∈ ∏t≥1∏i∈It Xi is feasible if ∑i∈It−1∪It xi∗t = et = ∑i∈It−1∪It eit for
all t ≥ 1 and it is interior if xi ∈ intXi for all i ∈ I.
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Definition 1 An equilibrium of the economy E is a list (p∗, (xi∗)) in ∆ ×∏∞
t=0
∏
i∈It X
i such that:
a) for all i ∈ I, (xi∗) is a maximal element for P i in the budget set associated
to the equilibrium price p∗, that is, Πt · xi∗ ≤ Πt · ei, and for all xi ∈ P i(xi∗),
Πt · xi > Πt · ei.
b) the allocation (xi∗) is feasible:∑
i∈It−1∪It
xi∗t = et for t ≥ 1
Proposition 1 Under Assumption A, if the initial endowments are strictly
positive, the OLG economy E has an equilibrium.
The existence of an equilibrium can be proved following the same procedure
as in [2]. The existence of an equilibrium in the truncated economies is obtained
by using the existence result in finite dimension of Gale and Mas-Colell [14],
[15], see also Florenzano [13]. Then, the limit argument follows the same steps
using the fact that the prices and the allocations of the equilibrium in the
truncated economies remain in compact sets for the product topology.
Definition 2 The feasible allocation x in
∏
i∈I X
i is Pareto optimal (PO)
(resp. weakly Pareto optimal (WPO)) if there is no (yi) in
∏
i∈I X
i such that:∑
i∈It−1∪It
yit = et, for t ≥ 1
and for all i ∈ I, yi ∈ P¯ i(xi), with yi ∈ P i(xi) for at least one individual i
(resp. and there exists t ≥ 1 such that for all t ≥ t, for all i ∈ It, yi = xi).
We remark that a PO allocation is WPO.
Definition 3 Let x = (xi) be an allocation in
∏
i∈I X
i. The price p ∈ ∆
is said to support x if for each t ∈ N, for all i ∈ It and for all ξi ∈ P i(xi),
Πt · ξi > Πt · xi.
Remark 1 Every competitive allocation x∗ = (xi∗) associated with the equi-
librium price p∗ ∈ ∆ is supported by p∗.
If x = (xi), an interior allocation, is supported by the price p, then for all
i ∈ I, there exists λi > 0 such that γi(xi) = λiΠt.
Lemma 1 If x = (xi), an interior allocation, is WPO, then, for all t ≥ 0,
γi(xi) = γj(xj) for all i, j ∈ It.
Proof. Let t ≥ 0. Since (xi) is WPO, ∑i∈It xi /∈ ∑i∈It P i(xi). Indeed, if it
would not hold, then there exists (ξi)i∈It ∈
∏
i∈It P
i(xi), such that
∑
i∈It x
i =
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∑
i∈It ξ
i. Then, one easily checks that the allocation (yi) defined by yi = xi for
i /∈ It and yi = ξi for i ∈ It is feasible and Pareto dominates (xi), which is in
contradiction with the weak Pareto optimality of (xi).
By Assumption A, (P i(xi))i∈It are convex and nonempty, and for all i,
xi /∈ P i(xi) and xi ∈ P¯ i(xi). So, for each i ∈ It, there exists a sequence
(ξiν) of P i(xi), which converges to xi. The set
∑
i∈It P
i(xi) being convex, so
by using the standard separation theorem for convex sets in finite-dimensional
space for
∑
i∈It x
i and
∑
i∈It P
i(xi), there exists q 6= 0 such that q ·∑i∈It xi ≤
q ·∑i∈It ξi for all (ξi) ∈∏i∈It P i(xi). Consider an individual i0 in It. Then for
all ξi0 ∈ P i0(xi0), q ·xi0 + q ·∑i∈It,i6=i0 xi ≤ q · ξi0 + q ·∑i∈It,i6=i0 ξiν . By taking
the limit, we obtain: q · xi0 ≤ q · ξi0 , which means that q belongs to the cone
−NP¯ i0 (xi0 )(xi0), thus q = ‖q‖γi0(xi0). By repeating the same reasoning for all
individuals of It, we establish that γi(xi) = 1‖q‖q for all i ∈ It. 
Lemma 2 The interior allocation x = (xi) is WPO if and only if there exists
a price sequence p ∈ ∆ which supports x = (xi).
Proof. Let x be supported by a price sequence p. Assume that x is not WPO,
then there exists a feasible allocation (yi) and some t ≥ 1 such that xi = yi for
all i ∈ It, t ≥ t, where yi ∈ P¯ i(xi) for all i ∈ I and yi ∈ P i(xi) for at least an
individual. Therefore, for all t and for all i ∈ It, Πt · yi ≥ Πt · xi with at least
one strict inequality for i0 ∈ It0 where t0 < t. Thus, we have:
p1 ·
∑
i∈I0∪I1
yi1 + p2 ·
∑
i∈I1∪I2
yi2 + . . .+ pt−1 ·
∑
i∈It−1∪It−2
yit−1 + pt ·
∑
i∈It−1
yit >
p1 ·
∑
i∈I0∪I1
xi1 + p2 ·
∑
i∈I1∪I2
xi2 + . . .+ pt−1 ·
∑
i∈It−1∪It−2
xit−1 + pt ·
∑
i∈It−1
xit
Since, yit = x
i
t for all i ∈ It, t ≥ t, we get:
p1 ·
∑
i∈I0∪I1
yi1 + p2 ·
∑
i∈I1∪I2
yi2 + . . .+ pt−1 ·
∑
i∈It−1∪It−2
yit−1 + pt ·
∑
i∈It−1∪It
yit >
p1 ·
∑
i∈I0∪I1
xi1 + p2 ·
∑
i∈I1∪I2
xi2 + . . .+ pt−1 ·
∑
i∈It−1∪It−2
xit−1 + pt ·
∑
i∈It−1∪It
xit
which is in contradiction with the feasibility of (xi) and (yi) implying∑
i∈It−1∪It
xit =
∑
i∈It−1∪It
yit = et
Conversely, let x be a WPO allocation. We first truncate the economy at a
finite horizon t by considering the t first generations. Denote Jt−1 =
∏t−1
τ=0 Iτ .
We shall prove the result by induction on the truncation at t.
First, consider the truncated economy E1 at date t = 1, which consists of the
generation 0, I0. From Lemma 1, p1 = γi(xi) for any i ∈ I0 supports (xi)i∈I0 .
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Now, suppose that (p1, . . . pt) is supporting (x
i)i∈Jt−1 , and let us prove
that there is a unique pt+1  0 such that (p1, . . . pt+1) supports (xi)i∈Jt .
From Lemma 1, for any i0 ∈ It, γi0(xi0) supports xi for all i ∈ It. So, it
suffices to prove that γi0t (x
i0) is collinear to pt and then to choose pt+1 =
‖pt‖
‖γi0t (xi0 )‖
γi0t+1(x
i0).
We consider a reduced economy with Lt commodities, the individuals in
It−1 ∪ It and the preferences defined by Qi(ξi) = P i(xit−1, ξi) for i ∈ It−1
and Qi(ξi) = P i(ξi, xit+1) for i ∈ It. Since x is a WPO allocation, the allo-
cation (xit)i∈It−1∪It is Pareto optimal in this finite economy. We also remark
that −NQi(xit)(xit) = {λγit(xit−1, xit) | λ ≥ 0} for i ∈ It−1 and −NQi(xit)(xit) =
{λγit(xit, xit+1) | λ ≥ 0} for i ∈ It. So, using the same argument as in the proof of
Lemma 1, we prove that the vectors ((γit(x
i
t−1, xit))i∈It−1 and (γit(xit, xit+1))i∈It
are colinear. Since (pt−1, pt) supports xi for any i ∈ It−1, pt is colinear to
γit(x
i
t−1, xit), so it is also colinear to γit(xit, xit+1) for all i ∈ It. 
Definition of aggregate Pareto improving transfers
The proof of the main result studies the behavior of Pareto improving transfers
that we now introduce. In the following, we distinguish transfers and aggregate
transfers. For an allocation (xi), for each generation t, we define an aggregate
preferred set as follows:
P¯t((x
i)) :=
∑
i∈It
P¯ i(xi)
From Assumption A, P¯t((x
i)) is a closed convex subset of RLt+ × RLt+1+ (or
RL1+ for the generation 0) and satisfies P¯t((xi)) + (R
Lt
+ × RLt+1+ ) ⊂ P¯t((xi)) (or
P¯t((x
i))+RL1+ ⊂ P¯t((xi)) for the generation 0). P¯t((xi)) is closed since P¯ i(xi) is
a nonempty closed subset of RLt+ ×RLt+1+ for all i ∈ It. Indeed, for all t and for
all i ∈ It, since P¯ i(xi) is closed, convex and comprehensive, its asymptotic cones
AP¯ i(xi), which coincides with its recession cones as defined in Rockafellar [22],
is equal to RLt+ × RLt+1+ . So, the asymptotic cones (AP¯ i(xi))i∈It are positively
semi-independent, that is, for all (ξi) ∈ ∏i∈It AP¯ i(xi) such that ∑i∈It ξi = 0,
then ξi = 0 for all i ∈ It. Consequently, from Debreu [12], the sum
∑
i∈It P¯
i(xi)
is closed.
If x = (xi) is an interior allocation supported by the price p ∈ ∆ and
xt =
∑
i∈It x
i. Then one checks that for all t ≥ 0, for all i ∈ It,
NP¯t((xi))(x¯
t) = {λΠt | λ ≥ 0} = {λγi(xi) | λ ≥ 0}
Definition 4 (a) For a given feasible allocation x = (xi), the sequence of
commodity transfers h = (hi) ∈∏i∈I0 RL1×∏∞t=1∏i∈It(RLt×RLt+1) is feasible
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if (xi+hi) is feasible, which means that (xi+hi) belongs to
∏∞
t=0
∏
i∈It X
i and∑
i∈It−1∪It h
i
t = 0.
(b) The sequence of commodity transfers h = (hi) is Pareto improving upon
x = (xi) if h is feasible and x+ h Pareto dominates x, that is for all t ≥ 1 and
all i ∈ It, xi + hi ∈ P¯ i(xi), with xi + hi ∈ P i(xi) for at least one agent i.
(c) An aggregate transfer h¯ ∈ RL1×∏∞t=1RLt×RLt+1 is feasible if h¯t−1t = −h¯tt
for all t ≥ 1 and Pareto improving upon the allocation x = (xi) if:
i) for all t, xt =
∑
i∈It x
i + h¯t ∈ P¯t((xi))
ii) there exists t such that xt =
∑
i∈It x
i + h¯t ∈ int(P¯t((xi)))
By the very definition of Pareto optimality, the allocation x = (xi) is Pareto
optimal if and only if there exists no feasible Pareto improving transfer upon
x. But, we also remark that the interior allocation x = (xi) is Pareto optimal
if and only if there exists no feasible aggregate Pareto improving transfer upon
x. So, in the next section, we will be able to work only on aggregate feasible
transfers and not on feasible transfers, which will greatly simplify the notations
and the formulas.
If there exists h¯, an agregate Pareto improving transfer, then let t ≥ 0, by
definition of P¯t((x
i)), there exists (ξi)i∈It in
∏
i∈It P¯
i(xi) such that
∑
i∈It x
i +
h¯t =
∑
i∈It ξ
i. By letting hi = ξi − xi, we easily check that xi + hi ∈ P¯ i(xi) for
all i ∈ It.
Furthermore, for t,
∑
i∈It x
i + h¯t−α(1Lt ,1Lt+1) ∈ P¯ t((xi)), for some λ > 0
small enough. Then there exists (ξi) ∈ ∏i∈It P¯ i(xi) such that ∑i∈It xi + h¯t −
λ(1Lt ,1Lt+1) =
∑
i∈It ξ
i. Let us consider the individual i0 ∈ It, we can then
write h¯t =
∑
i6=i0(ξ
i − xi) + (ξi0 − xi0) + λ(1Lt ,1Lt+1). Take hi = ξi − xi and
hi0 = ξi0 − xi0 + λ(1Lt ,1Lt+1). We note that xi0 + hi0 = ξi0 + λ(1Lt ,1Lt+1) ∈
P i0((xi0)). So, h is a Pareto improving transfer and x is not Pareto optimal.
Conversely, if x is not Pareto optimal, there exists h a Pareto improving
transfer. From the convexity of P i(xi) (Assumption A(a)), (1/2)h is also a
Pareto improving transfer. We now check that h¯ defined by h¯t = (1/2)
∑
i∈It h
i
is an aggregate Pareto improving transfer. h¯ is obviously feasible since h
is feasible. For all t, since (1/2)h is Pareto improving, xt + h¯t ∈ P¯t((xi)),
with xt =
∑
i∈It x
i. Since xi is an interior allocation, xi + (1/2)hi belongs
to the interior of Xi for all i. For the agent i0 of generation t0 such that
xi0 + hi0 ∈ P i0(xi0), since P i0(xi0) is open (Assumption A(a)), one gets that
there exists λ > 0 such that xi0 + (1/2)hi0 − λ(1Lt ,1Lt+1) ∈ P i0(xi0). So,∑
i∈It0 x
i + (1/2)hi − λ(1Lt ,1Lt+1) ∈
∑
i∈It0 P¯
i(xi) = P¯ t0((xi)), which implies
that
∑
i∈It0 x
i + (1/2)hi ∈ int(P¯t0((xi))).
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4 Characterization of Pareto-optimal allocations
We now state the main result of the paper. It provides a condition on the
supporting price of a weak Pareto optimal allocation, which is necessary and
sufficient for the Pareto optimality of the given allocation.
Proposition 2 Let x = (xi) ∈∏i∈I Xi be a WPO allocation supported by the
price sequence p = (p1, p2, . . . pt, . . .). We suppose that:
Assumption B: there exist χ¯ > 0 and χ > 0 such that for all t ≥ 1, e¯t ≤ χ¯1Lt,
χ(1Lt ,1Lt+1) ≤ xi for all i ∈ It and χ1L1 ≤ xi for all i ∈ I0;
Assumption C: there exists r > 0 such that for all i ∈ I, B(xi + rγi(xi), r) ⊂
P i(xi);
Assumption C’: there exists r¯ > 0 such that for all i ∈ I−0 (resp. i ∈ I0),
for all ξi ∈ P¯ i(xi), if ξi ≤ (et, et+1) (resp. ξi ≤ e1), then ξi ∈ B¯(xi +
r¯γi(xi), r¯);
Assumption G: there exists ν ≥ ν > 0 such that for all t ≥ 1, i ∈ It,
ν ≤ ‖γ
i
t(x
i)‖
‖γit+1(xi)‖
≤ ν
Then, x is Pareto optimal if and only if:∑
t∈N∗
1
‖pt‖ = +∞.
Since x is supported by the price sequence p = (p1, p2, . . . pt, . . .), we re-
call that Lemma 1 implies that for all period t, for all i ∈ It, 1‖Πt‖Πt =
1
‖(pt,pt+1)‖(pt, pt+1) is equal to γ
i(xi). We denote by γt the vector 1‖Πt‖Πt and
we let xt =
∑
i∈It x
i.
Remark 2 i) Assumptions C and C’ mean that the boundaries of the preferred
sets lie below small closed balls of radius r and above the comprehensive hull of
bigger closed balls of radius r¯. Assumptions C and C’ means that the preferences
are smooth and uniformly strictly convex. While Assumptions C and C’ in [3]
are stated in terms of curvature of the utility functions, we have chosen a more
geometric approach because the preferences are not representable by a utility
function.
For each individual i, let us consider the closed set F i defined as the com-
plementery of P i(xi), F i := {P i(xi). Then Assumption C means that F i is
prox-regular at xi. Indeed, let r > 0 and β > 0. The set F is called (r, β)-
prox-regular at x ∈ F , if for any y ∈ F ∩ B(x, β) and any v ∈ NP (F, y) with
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‖v‖ ≤ 1, y ∈ ProjF (y + rv) where NP (F, y) is the proximal normal cone to F
at y, that is:
NP (F, y) = {v | ∃ρ > 0, y ∈ ProjF (y + ρv)}
In our framework, under Assumption A,
NP (F, y) = {µγ(y) | µ ≥ 0}
The notion of prox-regularity was introduced by Poliquin and Rockafellar, as
a new important regularity in variational analysis, see [20], and extensively
studied by Colombo and Thibault in [11].
ii) Note that Assumption B implies that the number of individuals is uni-
formly bounded above at each generation. Indeed, if It is the number of individ-
ual of the generation t, and h is a commodity at period t, then Itχ ≤
∑
i∈It x
i
h ≤
eth ≤ χ¯. We denote by I¯, an upper bound of the number of individual at each
generation.
iii) Assumptions C and C’ still hold when we aggregate the finitely many
consumers at each period by considering the set P¯ t((xi)). Assumption C implies
B(xt + Itrγ
t, Itr) ⊂
∑
i∈It P
i(xi), thus, whatever is the number of consumers
of generation t, B(xt + rγt, r) ⊂ intP¯ t((xi)).
Let ξt ∈ P¯ t((xi)) such that ξt ≤ (et, et+1). Then Assumption C’ implies that
ξt belongs to
∑
i∈It B¯(x
i + r¯γi(xi), r¯), which is equal to B¯(xt + Itr¯γ
i(xi), Itr¯).
So uniformly in t, ξt belongs to B¯(xi + I¯ r¯γi(xi), I¯ r¯).
For the coherence of the notations, we let ρ = r and ρ¯ = I¯ r¯.
iv) We remark that Assumption G is slightly weaker than Property G in Balasko
and Shell in [3]. Indeed, Property G assumes that the ratio ps`‖Πt‖ is uniformly
bounded above and away from 0 for all period t, for s = t, t + 1 and for all
commodities ` at date t or t+ 1. Recalling that Πt is positively collinear to γ
t,
this clearly implies that the ratio
‖γtt‖
‖γtt+1‖ is uniformly bounded above and away
from 0 for all period t.
Remark 3 If h¯ is a feasible aggregate Pareto improving transfer upon (xi),
then by Definition 4, xt+ h¯t ∈ P¯ t((xi)), so thanks to Assumption C’, Πt · h¯t > 0,
if h¯t 6= 0. Using this fact and the feasibility condition h¯t−1t = −h¯tt, we easily
prove by induction that h¯t 6= 0 implies h¯t+1 6= 0. Since at least one generation
t0 is strictly better off after the transfer, h¯
t0 6= 0. So, there exist t ≥ 0 such
that h¯t = 0 for t < t and h¯t 6= 0 for t ≥ t.
4.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Since the allocation x = (xi) is Pareto optimal if and only if there exists no fea-
sible aggregate Pareto improving transfer upon x, the proof will be established
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by constructing and characterizing a sequence of aggregate Pareto improving
transfers.
Let h¯ be a feasible aggregate transfer. Set ηt := Πt · h¯t, the net present value
of the aggregate transfer h¯ at each date t.
When ηt 6= 0, let us define αt by:
αt :=
‖h¯t‖2‖Πt‖
Πt · h¯t
=
‖h¯t‖2‖Πt‖
ηt
Remark 4 i) Note that ‖h¯t‖2 = αtηt‖Πt‖ ≤
αt‖Πt‖‖h¯t‖
‖Πt‖ , thus ‖h¯t‖ ≤ αt. Thus, if α
is bounded then h¯ is also bounded.
ii) α
t
2 actually represents the radius of the sphere S(x
t + α
t
2 γ
t, α
t
2 ) which is
tangent to P¯ t((xi)) at xt, and contains xt + h¯t. Indeed, we easily check that:∥∥∥∥xt + h¯t − (xt + αt2 γt
)∥∥∥∥ = αt2
We prepare the proof by three lemmas and then we prove the necessary and
the sufficient condition in two additional lemmas.
Lemma 3 Let h¯ be a feasible aggregate Pareto improving transfer upon x =
(xi). Under Assumption C ′, from Remark 3, there exists t ≥ 0 such that ht = 0
for t < t and ht 6= 0 for t ≥ t. Then the sequence αt is bounded from above for
all t ≥ t.
Proof. Since h¯ is a feasible aggregate Pareto improving transfer, from Remark
3, h¯ 6= 0 and ηt 6= 0 for all t ≥ t. Furthermore, 0 ≤ ξt = xt+ h¯t ≤ (et, et+1). So,
from Assumption C ′ and Remark 2, for all t ≥ t, ξt ∈ B¯(xt + ρ¯γt, ρ¯). Hence,
from Remark 4 (ii), the sphere S(xt + α
t
2 γ
t, α
t
2 ), which is tangent to P¯
t((xi)) at
xt, and contains ξt is included in B¯(xt + ρ¯γt, ρ¯). So α
t
2 ≤ ρ¯, which shows that
αt is bounded from above. 
Lemma 4 Let h¯ be a feasible aggregate Pareto improving transfer upon x =
(xi). Under Assumption C ′, from Remark 3, there exists t ≥ 0 such that ht = 0
for t < t and ht 6= 0 for t ≥ t. Then, for all t ≥ t,
αt =
‖Πt‖
ηt
‖h¯t‖2 ≥ ‖Πt‖
ηt
[
1
‖pt‖2 (η
0 + . . .+ ηt−1)2 +
1
‖pt+1‖2 (η
0 + . . .+ ηt)2
]
Proof. Indeed, the construction of η and the feasibility of the transfer h allow
us to write:
η0 = p1 · h¯0 = p1 · h¯01 = −p1 · h¯11
η1 = Π1 · h¯1 = p1 · h¯11 + p2 · h¯12 = −p1 · h¯01 + p2 · h¯12
. . .
ηt = Πt · h¯t = pt · h¯tt + pt+1 · h¯tt+1 = −pt · h¯t−1t + pt+1 · h¯tt+1
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By summing up, we obtain that: η0 + η1 + . . .+ ηt = pt+1 · h¯tt+1. By definition,
for t ≥ t,
αt =
‖Πt‖
ηt
(‖h¯tt‖2 + ‖h¯tt+1‖2)
By Schwarz inequality, (pt · h¯tt)2 ≤ ‖pt‖2‖h¯tt‖2, that is:
(
pt·h¯tt
‖pt‖
)2 ≤ ‖h¯tt‖2, we
then obtain that:
αt ≥ ‖Πt‖
ηt
[
(pt · h¯tt)2
‖pt‖2 +
(pt+1 · h¯tt+1)2
‖pt+1‖2
]
Hence,
αt ≥ ‖Πt‖
ηt
[
1
‖pt‖2 (η
0 + . . .+ ηt−1)2 +
1
‖pt+1‖2 (η
0 + . . .+ ηt)2
]

Lemma 5 Let η be a positive sequence in R. Let us define an aggregate transfer
h¯ in RL1 ×∏∞t=1(RLt × RLt+1) and the associated α respectively by:
h¯tt+1 =
(
η0 + η1 + . . .+ ηt
) pt+1
‖pt+1‖2 and h¯
t
t = −h¯t−1t
αt =
‖Πt‖
ηt
‖h¯t‖2 = ‖Πt‖
ηt
[
1
‖pt‖2 (η
0 + . . .+ ηt−1)2 +
1
‖pt+1‖2 (η
0 + . . .+ ηt)2
]
Under Assumptions B and C, if α is bounded then there exists µ > 0 such that
µh¯ is a feasible Pareto improving aggregate transfer.
Remark 5 In Lemma 5, h¯ is computed in such a way that Πt · h¯t = ηt and the
associated αt is the smallest possible one.
Proof. Let µ > 0 be taken small enough so that µαt < 2ρ, for all t, which is
feasible since α = (αt) is bounded.
From the formula above and Remark 4 (ii), since µα
t
2 ≤ ρ, xt+µh¯t belongs to
the sphere S(xt + µα
t
2 γ
t, µα
t
2 ) ⊂ B(xt + ργt, ρ) ∪ {xt}. Since h¯t 6= 0, xt + µh¯t ∈
B(xt + ργt, ρ) \ {xt}. From Assumption C and Remark 2 (iii), xt + µh¯t ∈
intP¯ t((xi)), that is µh¯ is a feasible aggregate Pareto improving transfer upon
the allocation (xi). 
Lemma 6 Given the positive price sequence p, if x is not PO, then under
Assumption C ′,
∑
t∈N∗
1
‖pt‖ < +∞.
Proof. Since x is not PO, there exists a Pareto improving aggregate transfer h¯
such that h¯t = 0 for t < t and h¯t 6= 0 for t ≥ t for some t ≥ 0. From Lemma 3,
αt is bounded from above by 2ρ¯ for t ≥ t, thus, from Lemma 4, for all t ≥ t,
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2ρ¯ ≥ αt ≥ ‖Πt‖
ηt‖pt+1‖2 [η
0 + . . .+ ηt]2 ≥ 1
ηt‖pt+1‖ [η
0 + . . .+ ηt]2
since ‖Πt‖‖pt+1‖ =
√
1 + ‖pt‖
2
‖pt+1‖2 ≥ 1. Thus:
1
‖pt+1‖ ≤
2ρ¯ηt
[η0 + . . .+ ηt]2
But, ηt = 0 for t < t, so,
1
‖pt+1‖ ≤
2ρ¯ηt
[ηt + . . .+ ηt]2
Furthermore, for t > t,
ηt
[ηt + . . . ηt]2
≤ 1
ηt + . . .+ ηt−1
− 1
ηt + . . .+ ηt
This implies that:
∞∑
t=t+1
ηt
[ηt + . . .+ ηt]2
≤ 1
ηt
Hence ∞∑
t=t+2
1
‖pt‖ =
2ρ¯
ηt
< +∞
hence
∑
t∈N∗
1
‖pt‖ < +∞. 
Remark 6 The following example shows that if preferences are flat at the given
allocation, so not satisfying Assumption C’, then the allocation could be not
Pareto optimal even if
∑
t
1
‖pt‖ = +∞. Let us consider an OLG economy with
one commodity per period, one consumer per generation, the allocation (1, 1)
for all generation and the preferred set {ξ ∈ R2+ | tξt+(t+1)ξt+1 > 2t+1}. Then,
one easily check that this allocation is not Pareto optimal because the allocation
(1/2, 3/2) for each generation is Pareto dominating But, one also checks that
the price (1, 2, . . . , t, . . .) supports this allocation and
∑
t
1
‖pt‖ =
∑
t
1
t = +∞.
The last step of the proof of Proposition 2 is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 7 Under Assumptions B, C and G, if the positive price sequence p
satisfies
∑
t
1
‖pt‖ < +∞, then x is not PO.
Proof. Consider ηt = 1‖pt‖ for all t, and denote by η¯
t :=
∑t
s=1 η
s. Note that
(η¯t) is bounded. Let the corresponding agregate transfer h¯ and the associated
sequence α defined by the formula of Lemma 5. From this Lemma, it remains
to show that α is bounded.
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From Lemma 5, we have: h¯t = (η¯t−1 pt‖pt‖2 , η¯
t pt+1
‖pt+1‖2 ). Consequently, since
η¯t−1 ≤ η¯t, ‖h¯t‖2 = (η¯t−1)2 1‖pt‖2 + (η¯t)2 1‖pt+1‖2 ≤ (η¯t)2
(
1
‖pt‖2 +
1
‖pt+1‖2
)
. Since
ηt = 1‖pt‖ , the associated α defined in Lemma 5 satisfies:
αt = ‖Πt‖ηt ‖h¯t‖2 ≤ ‖Πt‖‖pt‖(η¯t)2
(
1
‖pt‖2 +
1
‖pt+1‖2
)
=
√‖pt‖2 + ‖pt+1‖2 (η¯t)2‖pt‖ (1 + ‖pt‖2‖pt+1‖2)
= (η¯t)2
√
1 + ‖pt+1‖
2
‖pt‖2
(
1 + ‖pt‖
2
‖pt+1‖2
)
Assumption G implies that ‖pt‖‖pt+1‖ and
‖pt+1‖
‖pt‖ are bounded. Since η¯
t is
bounded, α is so. 
Remark 7 The following example shows that if preferences exhibit a kink at
the given allocation, so not satisfying Assumption C, then the allocation could
be Pareto optimal even if
∑
t
1
‖pt‖ < +∞. Let us consider an OLG economy
with one commodity per period, one consumer per generation, the allocation
(1, 1) for all generation and the same preferred set {(1, 1)} + R2++. Then, one
easily checks that this allocation is Pareto optimal because to strictly improve
the welfare of an agent, we need to reduce the allocation of the agent of the next
generation when she is young so that her welfare strictly decreases. But, one
also checks that the price (1, 2, . . . , 2t, . . .) supports this allocation and
∑
t
1
‖pt‖
is finite.
5 Conclusion
Providing a simple set-theoretic and geometric version of the proof of Balasko
and Shell [3] has allowed us to directly consider the multi-goods case, while
in [3], the proof needs to first go through the one-commodity case. We have
encompassed the case of non-complete and non-transitive preferences where
basic assumptions are made on the preference sets and the associated normal
cones. We provide a characterization of Pareto optimality that is established
following a simple and geometric version of the proof of Balasko and Shell [3].
Moreover, we provide an explicit expression of improving transfers ht at each
date t, that do not satisfy the criterion. Indeed, this is easily obtained thanks
to the minimal value of the parameter α that is also used in [3].
A natural continuation to this work would be the extension to the case of
OLG models with heterogeneous longevities within each generation and durable
commodities.
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